lazserus
Apr 12th, 2007, 7:27 PM
The United States Military and Government have this practice of masking any military faux pas with heroism. If you look at the ratio of medals to successful military executions, you’ll see that whenever there’s a military disaster those that suffer receive medals; the Medal of Honor being the number one medal. When the U.S. military fails, they hand out a bunch of medals and then call it heroism, thus never actually admitting to their incompetence in those situations. This is not to say that any of those medals are undeserved, but it does shine a spotlight on how the military handles major mistakes. MacArthur has been classified as one of American history’s greatest war heroes due to this scandalous use of propaganda. Was General Douglas MacArthur the Pacific Theater’s great leader and hero like the history books claim?
http://www.historyanimated.com/PhilippinesPage.html - This linkis a flash animation that will help guide you through what happened in the Philippines under MacArthur, and especially provide you with visual correspondence to the testimony I'm presenting.
Arrogance, Mayhem, and Sheer Stupidity
On December 7, 1941, the naval base at Pearl Harbor suffered a catastrophic “surprise” attack from the Empire of Japan, delivering a crippling blow to the United States Navy. General Douglas MacArthur was stationed in the Philippines with his family in Manila, Philippines at the time when the news was wired. When he received the news he disappeared for a period of 10 hours, unable to be located by any of his officers. The next blow would surely be to the Philippines because it was a tactical goldmine for a Pacific Campaign. The official news reports informed the American public that the strike on the Philippines was simultaneous with Pearl Harbor, when in actuality there was a 10 hour warning that MacArthur chose to ignore. MacArthur has always been called an optimist, and that is definitely a desirable trait for a general, but that optimism should be smothered in humility. MacArthur was not one to be classified as modest in any aspect. Military generals must be aggressive and optimistic, but they must also be realistic and modest. MacArthur took full credit for the U.S. Army’s successes in the Pacific Theater (regardless of whether he had involvement), but projected his failures onto his subordinates. Upon returning from his 10 hour vacation, MacArthur began making absurd preparations for a Japanese invasion.
Allied Forces Initial Strength
Ground
20,000 Philippine regulars
100,000 Philippine recruits
11,796 U.S. regulars
Air
35 B-17 bombers
107 P40 fighters
Naval
1 Cruiser
1 Light Cruiser
17 submarines
A “Surprise” Attack, Plan Orange and MacArthur’s Plan
On December 8, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force led an air strike on American military airfields, destroying over half the United States’ aircrafts in the Philippines. Within less than three days, the rest of the force was obliterated by the Japanese. The U.S. strength in the Philippines relied strictly on the ground troops after the attack. As stated before, MacArthur had a 10 hour warning and did nothing. On December 10, 1941, 2,000 Japanese landed on the northern tip of Luzon and another 2,000 at a small port in the Langayen Gulf. An additional 2,500 troops landed on the southeastern flank of Luzon. Within ten days the Japanese had over 43,000 infantry in Luzon, supported by an armor division. In less than a week another 7,500 Japanese troops land in southern Luzon, and the Americans and Philippinos were pushed back. If MacArthur followed military procedure, his troops would have been able to hold the northern Japanese advance off for much longer and with fewer casualties. He ignored Plan Orange.
Plan Orange, or WPO-3, was a military plan developed nearly a decade before 1941, specifically for handling a Japanese invasion to the Philippines. Plan Orange stated that in the instance of a Japanese invasion the U.S. Army was to gradually pull back to the Bataan Peninsula while fighting off the invaders. A large supply stockpile resided in Bataan, which would allow for the military to hold off invaders while waiting for American troop reinforcements. Louis Morton from the United States Army’s official website wrote, “Under WPO-3, American troops were not to fight anywhere but in Central Luzon. The mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese naval forces. U.S. Army forces, constituting an Initial Protective Force, consisting of regular U.S. Army troops, had the main task of preventing enemy landings. Failing in this, they were to defeat those Japanese forces which succeeded in landing. If, despite these attempts, the enemy proved successful, the Initial Protective Force was to engage in delaying action but not at the expense of the primary mission, the defense of Manila Bay. The Americans were to make every attempt to hold back the Japanese advance while withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula. Bataan, recognized as the key to the control of Manila Bay, was to be defended to the ‘last extremity’.”
The plan, part of standard operating procedure in the Philippines, was designed for fairly obvious reasons. The U.S. Army had been in the Philippines since the Spanish-American War, and since then the training of Philippine natives as a major military force had ensued. By retreating to Bataan, the U.S. forces would have had plenty of geographic protection and enough supplies to fend off the Japanese. MacArthur, in his arrogance, decided to scrap Plan Orange and redistribute the American regulars and supplies across the Philippines, thinning the supplies out significantly. His intent, while pragmatically unrealistic, was to prevent a Japanese occupation by stopping them before they could get into central Luzon. With a standing army of at least 30,000 and possibly up to 100,000 strong, there appears to be no reason why MacArthur’s forces would be incapable of holding off an aggressive Japanese invasion of 12,000. Because MacArthur dispersed and thinned out his troops across Luzon, he had no particular strength. MacArthur came across a “brilliant” idea after this folly to implement Plan Orange, calling it his own.
By December 24, 1941, the Japanese forces had pushed the Americans and their allies so far back that MacArthur called for WPO-3: he called for troops to fall back to Bataan in accordance with military SOP, but claimed it as his own idea. The major issue stood that there were no longer enough supplies to sustain a long-term defensive against the Japanese at that point. In MacArthur’s defense, the U.S. military was not prepared to reinforce Bataan as planned. Sound files from the period recorded from the U.S. Navy’s admiral supports this. He stated that the navy planned to “delay” its support to Bataan. The U.S, Army in the Philippines was doomed. They had no supplies, no resources and no real force to defend against the Japanese.
The Fall of Bataan and MacArthur’s Flee
When MacArthur finally decided to execute WPO-3 he was still able to completely destroy the tactical purpose of it. On the entry of the Bataan Peninsula there is a mountain called Mt. Natib, which is poised right in the center of the northern area of the peninsula. MacArthur stations troops on either side of the mountain in order to keep the Japanese at bay, but he choose not to actually defend Mt. Natib. His line stretched from either side of the mountain, but no forces were positioned throughout the mountain. His position was that it was an impossible pathway and that the Japanese could never pass the landscape. MacArthur’s self assurance, even in this endeavor, was another fallacy. The Japanese were extremely determined and dedicated to their conquer, and were notorious for being able to penetrate the most impenetrable geographical areas. They took Singapore because they navigated the “impassible” jungles, so Mt. Nutib was not going to stop them. Because Mt. Nutib was not defended, the Japanese was able to send a small number through the mountainous terrain and flank the American forces, pushing them back further. While MacArthur’s forces were never to be reinforced, the Japanese were able to build a force of 12,000 to over 200,000, while the Allied Forces were stuck with a depleting force of no more, and possibly fictional numbers, of 100,000 Allied soldiers.
As the Japanese pushed the Allied Forces deeper into Bataan, General MacArthur was ordered to leave the Philippines. Unlike Colonel Hal Moore, a legendary commander of the 7th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division during the Vietnam War, MacArthur fled and left his troops to the Japanese. Colonel Moore, during one of the first landings in Vietnam, was ordered to abandon his men and he refused. MacArthur had no qualms with fleeing. Upon fleeing he placed General Jonathon Wainright IV in charge of the defending U.S. troops, leaving him orders to not surrender. MacArthur was picked up by PT Boats, allowing only himself, his wife, his son, and his son’s nanny aboard the vessels. General Wainright defended Bataan as best as he could for as long as he could, but was forced to surrender to the Japanese. He and his surviving soldiers were then forced on the Death March, the notorious march the Japanese forced Allied soldiers to endure from Bataan to San Jose; the march was a 140 mile march without food or water across the Philippines.
MacArthur was a fake. He was a media hound. He had a private under his command that would ruffle up his cap, but press his uniform in order to look good in front of cameras. The ruffled hat would portray a sense of rugged duty and first-hand experience, while his uniform would be neatly pressed in order to deliver a prettiness. Many photos of MacArthur show him with a corn-cobbed pipe in his mouth, but he only kept that for photo opportunities. He never actually lit the pipe. General Wainright received the Medal of Honor for his command and surrender in Bataan, but MacArthur tried to veto it, calling him a traitor for surrendering. General Douglas MacArthur called the man he left in command a traitor for surrendering while he fled the country with his tail tucked between his legs.
MacArthur fled to Australia and the media was waiting for him when he got off his plane. His legendary response to losing the Philippines was, “I shall return.” Note he didn’t say “we.” While he is considered a dedicated war hero, President Truman has gone on record shaming him.
Mr. Prima Donna, if you don't think Hobie is really beastly, you are not a beast. Brass Hat, Five Star MacArthur. He's worse than the Cabots and the Lodges—they at least talked with one another before they told God what to do. Mac tells God right off. It's a very great pity we have stuffed shirts like that in key positions. I don't see why in hell Roosevelt didn't order Wainwright home and let MacArthur be a martyr. We'd have had a real General and a fighting man if we had Wainwright and not a play actor and a bunco man such as we have now.
Hero or chump?
I have included this link (http://www.historyanimated.com/PhilippinesPage.html) to a flash presentation of the military events that transpired during 1941-42. The flash presentation is wonderful and was introduced to me by a history professor and author. It contains animations, authentic audio clips, and summations of what happened in the Philippines.
http://www.historyanimated.com/PhilippinesPage.html - This linkis a flash animation that will help guide you through what happened in the Philippines under MacArthur, and especially provide you with visual correspondence to the testimony I'm presenting.
Arrogance, Mayhem, and Sheer Stupidity
On December 7, 1941, the naval base at Pearl Harbor suffered a catastrophic “surprise” attack from the Empire of Japan, delivering a crippling blow to the United States Navy. General Douglas MacArthur was stationed in the Philippines with his family in Manila, Philippines at the time when the news was wired. When he received the news he disappeared for a period of 10 hours, unable to be located by any of his officers. The next blow would surely be to the Philippines because it was a tactical goldmine for a Pacific Campaign. The official news reports informed the American public that the strike on the Philippines was simultaneous with Pearl Harbor, when in actuality there was a 10 hour warning that MacArthur chose to ignore. MacArthur has always been called an optimist, and that is definitely a desirable trait for a general, but that optimism should be smothered in humility. MacArthur was not one to be classified as modest in any aspect. Military generals must be aggressive and optimistic, but they must also be realistic and modest. MacArthur took full credit for the U.S. Army’s successes in the Pacific Theater (regardless of whether he had involvement), but projected his failures onto his subordinates. Upon returning from his 10 hour vacation, MacArthur began making absurd preparations for a Japanese invasion.
Allied Forces Initial Strength
Ground
20,000 Philippine regulars
100,000 Philippine recruits
11,796 U.S. regulars
Air
35 B-17 bombers
107 P40 fighters
Naval
1 Cruiser
1 Light Cruiser
17 submarines
A “Surprise” Attack, Plan Orange and MacArthur’s Plan
On December 8, 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force led an air strike on American military airfields, destroying over half the United States’ aircrafts in the Philippines. Within less than three days, the rest of the force was obliterated by the Japanese. The U.S. strength in the Philippines relied strictly on the ground troops after the attack. As stated before, MacArthur had a 10 hour warning and did nothing. On December 10, 1941, 2,000 Japanese landed on the northern tip of Luzon and another 2,000 at a small port in the Langayen Gulf. An additional 2,500 troops landed on the southeastern flank of Luzon. Within ten days the Japanese had over 43,000 infantry in Luzon, supported by an armor division. In less than a week another 7,500 Japanese troops land in southern Luzon, and the Americans and Philippinos were pushed back. If MacArthur followed military procedure, his troops would have been able to hold the northern Japanese advance off for much longer and with fewer casualties. He ignored Plan Orange.
Plan Orange, or WPO-3, was a military plan developed nearly a decade before 1941, specifically for handling a Japanese invasion to the Philippines. Plan Orange stated that in the instance of a Japanese invasion the U.S. Army was to gradually pull back to the Bataan Peninsula while fighting off the invaders. A large supply stockpile resided in Bataan, which would allow for the military to hold off invaders while waiting for American troop reinforcements. Louis Morton from the United States Army’s official website wrote, “Under WPO-3, American troops were not to fight anywhere but in Central Luzon. The mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese naval forces. U.S. Army forces, constituting an Initial Protective Force, consisting of regular U.S. Army troops, had the main task of preventing enemy landings. Failing in this, they were to defeat those Japanese forces which succeeded in landing. If, despite these attempts, the enemy proved successful, the Initial Protective Force was to engage in delaying action but not at the expense of the primary mission, the defense of Manila Bay. The Americans were to make every attempt to hold back the Japanese advance while withdrawing to the Bataan Peninsula. Bataan, recognized as the key to the control of Manila Bay, was to be defended to the ‘last extremity’.”
The plan, part of standard operating procedure in the Philippines, was designed for fairly obvious reasons. The U.S. Army had been in the Philippines since the Spanish-American War, and since then the training of Philippine natives as a major military force had ensued. By retreating to Bataan, the U.S. forces would have had plenty of geographic protection and enough supplies to fend off the Japanese. MacArthur, in his arrogance, decided to scrap Plan Orange and redistribute the American regulars and supplies across the Philippines, thinning the supplies out significantly. His intent, while pragmatically unrealistic, was to prevent a Japanese occupation by stopping them before they could get into central Luzon. With a standing army of at least 30,000 and possibly up to 100,000 strong, there appears to be no reason why MacArthur’s forces would be incapable of holding off an aggressive Japanese invasion of 12,000. Because MacArthur dispersed and thinned out his troops across Luzon, he had no particular strength. MacArthur came across a “brilliant” idea after this folly to implement Plan Orange, calling it his own.
By December 24, 1941, the Japanese forces had pushed the Americans and their allies so far back that MacArthur called for WPO-3: he called for troops to fall back to Bataan in accordance with military SOP, but claimed it as his own idea. The major issue stood that there were no longer enough supplies to sustain a long-term defensive against the Japanese at that point. In MacArthur’s defense, the U.S. military was not prepared to reinforce Bataan as planned. Sound files from the period recorded from the U.S. Navy’s admiral supports this. He stated that the navy planned to “delay” its support to Bataan. The U.S, Army in the Philippines was doomed. They had no supplies, no resources and no real force to defend against the Japanese.
The Fall of Bataan and MacArthur’s Flee
When MacArthur finally decided to execute WPO-3 he was still able to completely destroy the tactical purpose of it. On the entry of the Bataan Peninsula there is a mountain called Mt. Natib, which is poised right in the center of the northern area of the peninsula. MacArthur stations troops on either side of the mountain in order to keep the Japanese at bay, but he choose not to actually defend Mt. Natib. His line stretched from either side of the mountain, but no forces were positioned throughout the mountain. His position was that it was an impossible pathway and that the Japanese could never pass the landscape. MacArthur’s self assurance, even in this endeavor, was another fallacy. The Japanese were extremely determined and dedicated to their conquer, and were notorious for being able to penetrate the most impenetrable geographical areas. They took Singapore because they navigated the “impassible” jungles, so Mt. Nutib was not going to stop them. Because Mt. Nutib was not defended, the Japanese was able to send a small number through the mountainous terrain and flank the American forces, pushing them back further. While MacArthur’s forces were never to be reinforced, the Japanese were able to build a force of 12,000 to over 200,000, while the Allied Forces were stuck with a depleting force of no more, and possibly fictional numbers, of 100,000 Allied soldiers.
As the Japanese pushed the Allied Forces deeper into Bataan, General MacArthur was ordered to leave the Philippines. Unlike Colonel Hal Moore, a legendary commander of the 7th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division during the Vietnam War, MacArthur fled and left his troops to the Japanese. Colonel Moore, during one of the first landings in Vietnam, was ordered to abandon his men and he refused. MacArthur had no qualms with fleeing. Upon fleeing he placed General Jonathon Wainright IV in charge of the defending U.S. troops, leaving him orders to not surrender. MacArthur was picked up by PT Boats, allowing only himself, his wife, his son, and his son’s nanny aboard the vessels. General Wainright defended Bataan as best as he could for as long as he could, but was forced to surrender to the Japanese. He and his surviving soldiers were then forced on the Death March, the notorious march the Japanese forced Allied soldiers to endure from Bataan to San Jose; the march was a 140 mile march without food or water across the Philippines.
MacArthur was a fake. He was a media hound. He had a private under his command that would ruffle up his cap, but press his uniform in order to look good in front of cameras. The ruffled hat would portray a sense of rugged duty and first-hand experience, while his uniform would be neatly pressed in order to deliver a prettiness. Many photos of MacArthur show him with a corn-cobbed pipe in his mouth, but he only kept that for photo opportunities. He never actually lit the pipe. General Wainright received the Medal of Honor for his command and surrender in Bataan, but MacArthur tried to veto it, calling him a traitor for surrendering. General Douglas MacArthur called the man he left in command a traitor for surrendering while he fled the country with his tail tucked between his legs.
MacArthur fled to Australia and the media was waiting for him when he got off his plane. His legendary response to losing the Philippines was, “I shall return.” Note he didn’t say “we.” While he is considered a dedicated war hero, President Truman has gone on record shaming him.
Mr. Prima Donna, if you don't think Hobie is really beastly, you are not a beast. Brass Hat, Five Star MacArthur. He's worse than the Cabots and the Lodges—they at least talked with one another before they told God what to do. Mac tells God right off. It's a very great pity we have stuffed shirts like that in key positions. I don't see why in hell Roosevelt didn't order Wainwright home and let MacArthur be a martyr. We'd have had a real General and a fighting man if we had Wainwright and not a play actor and a bunco man such as we have now.
Hero or chump?
I have included this link (http://www.historyanimated.com/PhilippinesPage.html) to a flash presentation of the military events that transpired during 1941-42. The flash presentation is wonderful and was introduced to me by a history professor and author. It contains animations, authentic audio clips, and summations of what happened in the Philippines.